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COMMENTS
hibition against the riparian owner's use of the water to serve
non-riparian lands adjoining his riparian estate, but which have
been purchased subsequent to the initial exercise of the servitude.
It is submitted that the solution to the problem lies in the adop-
tion of comprehensive legislation designed to treat all related
problems of water law. The present system, composed only of
statutes passed to meet limited problems, has produced a number
of conflicts from which inequitable results are apt to follow.
Jerry G. Jones
The Effect of Insanity at the Time of Marriage
It is almost universally accepted that the marriage of an
insane person is null. However, there exists considerable di-
versity of opinion as to the nature and effect of such nullity. A
brief survey of various legal systems is offered as foundation
for a discussion of the problems which the subject raises under
the law of Louisiana.1
In Other Legal Systems
The Canon Law Code 2 does not mention insanity in its enu-
meration of the impediments to marriage.3 The canonists em-
ploy a strict definition of the term impediment, that is, "a cir-
cumstance attaching to the person which . . .renders his mar-
riage either illicit or invalid."'4 By this is meant a condition
of a person by reason of which he is forbidden either to marry
or to marry certain persons. On the other hand, insanity in its
relation to the marriage contract is considered to be a circum-
stance affecting consent rather than the person. The effect of
insanity on marriage is drawn from the wording of Canon 10815
solve problems in the field of mineral law. The present writer feels this same
position may be taken by the court in matters of water law if legislative reform
does not remedy the situation.
1. A discussion of the subject with respect to (a) degrees of insanity and
(b) intoxication as having the effect of insanity is not within the scope of this
Comment. See generally Annots., 28 A.L.R. 635, 648 (1924). See McCurdy,
Insanity as a Ground for Annulment or Divorce in English or American Law, 29
VA. L. REV. 771, 790 (1943), for a discussion of insanity in divorce law.
2. CODEX CANONICI JURIS (1918).
3. The dirament (annulling) impediments are enumerated and defined in
Canons 1067 through 1080 and the impedient impediments (rendering a marriage
illicit but not null) in Canons 1058 through 1066.
4. BOUSCAREN & ELLIS, CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 481-85,
Canon 1035, commentaries 1, 2 (2d ed. 1951).
5. CODEX CANONICI JuRIs, Canon 1081 (1918).
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which requires consent "lawfully expressed between parties
capable according to law" for a valid marriage. An insane per-
son is held to be incapable of the necessary consent, and there-
fore a marriage attempted by such a person is null.0
This has been the standard disposition of the problem in mod-
ern law. Neither French law nor the common law prohibits the
marriage of an insane person. In both systems, insanity results
in a total lack of capacity to consent and the marriage is abso-
lutely null in French law7 and void at common law.8
The formulation of the problem of insanity and marriage in
terms of capacity and consent has certain logical consequences.
A person subject to periodical insanity might marry during a
lucid interval. The marriage would be valid 9 because, in theory,
it is not the insanity but the lack of consent produced by insanity
which renders the marriage null. In such a case, the insane per-
son would have had consensual capacity at the time of the mar-
riage. Were insanity classified as an impediment, such a situa-
tion would not arise, for the mere existence of mental derange-
ment would be sufficient to nullify the marriage and inquiry into
the matter of consent would be unnecessary. Possibly it is felt
that such extreme cases would be rare and that it is preferable
to have the parties assume the risk in the interest of family and
marital stability.
6. 1 BOUSCAREN, CANON LAW DIGEST 518 (1934), citing 10 A.A.S. 517;
Rota, Dec. 7, 1918 (Jurgens-De Hoog) ; 12 A.A.S. 338; Rota, Dec. 23, 1918
(Lacroix-Shink).
7. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITII tL]tMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL nos 708, 1035
(12th ed. 1939).
8. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Jons. Ch. 343 (N.Y. 1820) ; 1 BL. COMM. 438,
439. 1
9. Hamaker v. Hamaker, 18 Ill. 138, 65 Am. Dec. 705 (1856).
There is a distinction between canon law, on one hand, and common and
French law, on the other, in that under the latter systems, if a person has been
adjudicated insane his subsequent marriage, though contracted during a lucid
interval, may be null. In canon law there is no provision for a judicial declaration
of insanity.
However, in both French and Anglo-American law, a controversy has de-
veloped as to whether a judgment of insanity produces an absolute legal in-
capacity to contract marriage, or prima facie evidence of such incapacity, or
whether, in spite of the judgment, the question remains one of the fact of the
party's actual capacity at the time of the ceremony. Annot., 28 A.L.R. 649 (1924) ;
1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITk YLMMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 709 (12th ed.
1939).
In Louisiana, the Supreme Court has said, in reference to a conventional con-
tract, that interdiction does not create incapacity, but is conclusive evidence of
such, and the contract is null. Succession of Lanata, 205 La. 915, 18 So.2d 502
[Vol. XVI
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In French law' and at common law," a suit for nullity on
grounds of insanity is allowed to either party. Since the mar-
riage is absolutely null or void, it produces no legal relations and
binds neither party. 12 Legally there is no marriage but a judg-
ment to that effect is generally required as conducive to good
order and peace of conscience of the parties. 8
In comparatively recent times there has been a tendency to
view the marriage of an insane person as relatively null or void-
able rather than absolutely null or void. This change, usually by
statute, has taken place in both civil law 1 4 and in many Anglo-
American jurisdictions. The rationale of this innovation is that,
although the problem is still one of capacity to consent, insanity
renders consent merely defective rather than totally lacking.
The insane party, because of his defective consent, is afforded
a privilege of avoiding the marriage. 5 However, the marriage
may be ratified after the insane party regains his sanity. 6 If
the party having the privilege of avoiding signifies an intent to
affirm rather than avoid the marriage, it is perfected. Such af-
(1944). No case has been found in which consent to a marriage contract was at
issue.
Where no judgment of insanity has been obtained, all three systems treat the
problem in the same manner.
10. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PLIMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 1035 (12th
ed. 1939).
11. Daniele v. Margulies, 95 N.J.Eq. 9, 121 Atl. 772 (1923).
12. Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774 (1877) : "It [the marriage]
was a nullity and the plaintiff [the sane party] was in no way bound to the de-
fendant by any marriage relation."
13. Ibid.
14. See PHILIPPINES CIVIL CODE arts. 85(3), 87(3) (1949) ; ITALIAN CODICE
CivILE art. 120 (1942).
15. See discussion in Walters v. Walters, 168 N.C. 411, 84 S.E. 703, 51 A.L.R.
845 (1927).
16. Ibid.
In theory, a void marriage produces no legal relations, PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITIk ILt MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 1045 (12th ed. 1939) ; Powell v. Powell,
18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774, 51 A.L.R. 852 (1877), and therefore is not sus-
ceptible of ratification, for there is nothing to be ratified.
However, in the leading case of Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343,
(N.Y. 1820), Chancellor Kent, though declaring the marriage absolutely void,
added, "and [the marriage] never since obtained any validity, because the plain-
tiff has never, since the return of her lucid interval, ratified or consummated it."
In Powell v. Powell, supra, similar language was used. These cases would tend
to cast doubt on the proposition that marriages, void for want of mental capacity,
were not susceptible of ratification at common law. But it should be remembered
that at the time of these decisions the so-called common law marriage was gen-
erally recognized and it is difficult to determine whether the courts were speaking
of ratification of the old marriage or of an entirely new exchange of consent,
constituting a new marriage. See McCurdy, Insanity as a Ground for Annulment
or Divorce in English or American Law, 29 VA. L. REV. 771, 780 (1943).
No such doubt seems to have existed in French law. See 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITt ILtlMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 1045 (12th ed. 1939).
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firmation may be either tacit, as by voluntary cohabitation, or
express.
When the marriage of an insane person is held to be rela-
tively null or voidable the usual result is an impairment of the
sane party's right to sue for nullity. Since the privilege of avoid-
ing the marriage is based on the defect in the insane party's con-
sent,1 7 there is little theoretical support for a like privilege in
the sane person. His consent, it is presumed, was entirely unim-
paired. Thus, in some jurisdictions relief is expressly limited to
the insane party.'8 However, in many jurisdictions the com-
petent party is granted an action, but usually under certain limi-
tations. He may be required to show that he was ignorant of the
other party's condition at the time of the marriage, l9 or that the
parties have not cohabited 20 after the defective party has been
restored to reason. In other jurisdictions, despite the fact that
the marriage is held to be merely voidable, the right to sue is
granted unconditionally to either party.21
The so-called eugenic laws recently adopted in many Ameri-
can jurisdictions evidence a change of approach to the problem
of the marriage of an insane person. The basis of these laws is
the possible transmission of certain types of insanity by inheri-
tance and the environmental effects of parental insanity on off-
spring. Consequently, under such laws, it is the insanity itself,
rather than a lack of consensual capacity, which impedes the
marriage and such marriages are prohibited. The eugenic stat-
utes vary as to the effects of insanity on the marriage. In some
states the marriage is void, 22 in others it is merely voidable,23
whereas in others 24 only preventive machinery is established by
17. See discussion in Walters v. Walters, 168 N.C. 411, 84 S.E. 703, 51 A.L.R.
845 (1915).
18. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 106.030, 107.020 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
4701[1], 4702[2], 4703[3] (1955).
19. English Marital Causes Act, L.R. Stat., 1 EDW. VIII and GEo. VI, c. 57,
§7(1)(b) (1937).
20. HAWAII'REV. LAWS § 122006 (1945) "... have not freely cohabited
as man and wife" after restoration to sanity; MONT. REV. CODE §§ 48-202(3),
48-203(3) (1947).
21. NEV. COMP. LAWS §§ 4067, 4069 (1929) ; VA. CODE §§ 20-45, 20-89 (1950)
and Cornwall v. Cornwall, 160 Va. 183, 163 S.E. 439 (1933).
22. Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.020 (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (Vernon
1949) ; UTAu CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (1953).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 13 :101(b) (1) (1953).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 69 (Deering 1949) issuing officers forbidden to issue
licenses to imbeciles or the insane; and Ky. REV. STAT. §402.990(2) (1953),
which provides a fine to be levied upon any person who marries or aids and
abets in the marriage of a feeble-minded person, idiot, or lunatic.
[Vol. XVI
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means of which the state attempts to discourage the marriage,
but may afford the marriage full validity should it occur. Where
the marriage is considered void, either party is allowed to sue
for annullment.25 If it is considered voidable, the standing of
the sane party to sue depends upon the particular statute. While
the eugenic laws represent an exception to the usual approach
to the marriage of an insane person, they do not represent an
abandonment of the theory of consent. Normally, the statutes
apply only to persons afflicted with certain types of hereditable
insanity2 0 and age groups most likely to produce offspring.2 7
Therefore these states retain conventional consent statutes to
cover situations not embraced by the eugenic laws.
In Louisiana
The marriage of an insane person presents a peculiar prob-
lem in Louisiana, for, although the system of law is funda-
mentally statutory, there is no specific legislation on the sub-
ject .2  A similar situation exists in only two other American
jurisdictions29 and there the common law is employed. It might
be expected that the Louisiana court would resort to French
authorities, since the problem is basically one of interpretation
of code provisions similar to those of the Code Napoleon. 0
25. Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.250 (1953) ; UTAII CODE ANN. § 30-1-17 (1953).
26. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (1952), which provides that: "No per-
son who has been . . . adjudged afflicted with hereditary epilepsy or heredity
insanity shall marry in this state, until after he or she has submitted to an
operation for sterilization."
27. See, e.g., N. D. REV. CODE § 14-0307 (1953), which prohibits the marriage
of a woman under the age of forty-five years or of a man of any age, except with
a woman over the age of forty-five years, if either the man or the woman "is a
common drunkard, a habitual criminal, an epileptic, an imbecile, a feeble-minded
person, an idiot, an insane person or one afflicted with hereditary insanity ......
28. See LA. CIVIL CODE title IV, cc. 2-4 (1870), where the questions of nullity
and annullment are covered. No mention is made of insanity or mental com-
petence as such.
29. Alabama: Willis v. Willis, 238 Ala. 153, 189 So. 873 (1939) ; Florida:
Savage v. Olson, 151 Fit. 241, 9 So.2d 363 (1942).
30. That insanity produces nullity in Louisiana does not appear to have been
questioned, although it is not mentioned as having such effect in the Civil Code.
It seems clear that insanity as a cause of nullity in Louisiana may be drawn
from LA. CIVIL CODE art. 90 (1870). "As the law considers marriage in no other
view than that of a civil contract, it sanctions all those marriages where the
parties, at the time of making them, were:
"'1. Willing to contract.
"2. Able to contract.
"3. Did contract .... " (Emphasis added.)
Consent is a necessary element of any contract and mental capacity is neces-
sary for consent. Therefore, by unavoidable implication, article 90 makes insanity
a grounds for nullity in Louisiana.
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But the decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that this
course has not been followed. In the recent case of Stier v.
Price-" the court's opinion on the question was clearly defined.8 2
The plaintiff, wife of the defendant for twelve years, sued to
have the marriage annulled, alleging that her husband was in-
sane at the time of the marriage. The ground for annullment
alleged was that the defendant's consent was not free because
of his insanity.33 The court said: "As to the plaintiff's conten-
tion in regard to the lack of consent on the part of her husband,
if he did not consent due to his mental condition, under the pro-
visions of [Louisiana Civil Code] article 110 he or his legal rep-
resentatives are the only persons who can be heard to com-
plain. ' 34 Article 110M, enumerates the persons who may main-
tain an action in nullity on the grounds of a lack of free consent
to a marriage. Hence, the court holds that insanity results in a
lack of "free" consent. The right to sue is limited to that party
whose consent is not free and the marriage is susceptible of rati-
fication.36 It is clear from the opinion that the court considers
the question of marriage by an insane person to be a case of rela-
tive nullity in Louisiana.
The Stier decision does not find firm support in either the
Code or French writings. In basing its opinion on article 110,
the court stated that in chapter 4 of title IV,3 7 wherein article 110
is found, the specific grounds for nullity are enumerated. 8  But
31. 214 La. 394, 37 So.2d 847 (1947).
32. In an earlier case, the court cited LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 110, Ill (1870),
in ruling that where a couple have lived together as man and wife subsequent to
a marriage, the validity of the marriage could not then be contested on the
grounds that the husband was insane at the time of celebration. The court did
not express an opinion on the question of relative or absolute nullity. It merely
cited articles 110 and 111. Sabalot v. Populus, 31 La. Ann. 854 (1879). No other
cases have been found where the question of nullity based on insanity was at
issue.
33. The plaintiff also alleged that her own consent was not free in that she
would not have consented had she known of her husband's insanity. 214 La. 394,
399, 37 So.2d 847, 849 (1948). The specific plea was "mistake respecting the
person," and the court held that insanity is not such a quality of a person that
a mistake, respecting the existence thereof in the other party to a marriage, will
cause nullity. Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
34. 214 La. 394, 400, 37 So.2d 849, 850 (1947).
35. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 110 (1870) : "Marriages celebrated without the free
consent of the married persons, or one of them, can only be annulled upon ap-
plication of both the parties, or that one of them whose consent was not free.
"When there has been a mistake in the person, the party laboring under the
mistake can alone impeach the marriage."
36. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 111 (1870).
37. LA. CIVIL CODE title IV (1870) : Of Husband and wife. Chapter 4 of title
VI: Of the Nullity of Marriages (arts. 110-118).
38. Stier v. Price, 214 La. 398, 37 So.2d 848 (1947).
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from a reading of that chapter in conjunction with chapter 2" of
the same title, it becomes apparent that it is chapter 2 which
enumerates the specific grounds for nullity and that chapter 4
deals only with the effects of nullity, and with the suit for nullity
and who may bring it. Planio °4 0 concurs in this view. Further,
Civil Code article 113 of chapter 4 speaks of suits based on "the
other incapacities or nullities enumerated in the second chapter
of this title." Hence, article 110 neither identifies nor defines
grounds for nullity, this being the function of the articles in
chapter 2. Article 110 limits the persons to whom an action in
nullity is given on grounds of a lack of free consent, restricting
the action to both parties or the one whose consent was not free.41
Article 11142 states that in such instances annullment will not be
granted if the parties have cohabited freely "after recovering
their liberty or discovering the mistake." Thus, the character-
istics of a limited right to sue and the possibility of ratification
identity such nullities as are within the application of article 110
as relative nullities. Article 11343 specifically grants the right
to sue for nullity on all grounds enumerated in chapter 2 not cov-
ered by article 110. Suit is allowed to either party, any interested
person, or the attorney general; and no provision is made for
ratification. Of necessity such nullities are absolute. Therefore
the questions raised by these articles must be: to which causes
of nullity in chapter 2 is article 110 applicable and is insanity
among them?
The very wording of article 110 makes its application to the
grounds for nullity stated in article 9144 of chapter 2 apparent.
39. Title IV, chapter 2: How Marriages May Be Contracted or Made (arts.
90-98).
40. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt 1iLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL n ° 995 (12th
ed. 1939). In this section, PIaniol discusses the relation of the chapters of the
title on marriage in the Code Civil, which title is essentially the same as to sub-
ject matter and organization as title IV of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825 and
1870.
41. See note 35 supra.
42. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 111 (1870).
43. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 113 (1870) reads in part: "Every marriage con-
tracted under the other incapacities or nullities enumerated in the second chapter
of this title may be impeached either by the married persons themselves, or by
any person interested, or by the Attorney General .... "
44. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 91 (1870) : "No marriage is valid to which the par-
ties have not freely consented.
"Consent is not free:
"1. When given to a ravisher, unless it has been given by the party ravished,
after she has been restored to the enjoyment of liberty;
"2. When it is extorted by violence;




Article 110 concerns "marriages celebrated without the free con-
sent of the married persons or one of them," and article 91 states
that "no marriage is valid to which the parties have not freely
consented." In no other article in either chapter is freedom of
consent mentioned. Therefore, for article 110 to be applicable to
the case of insanity, insanity as a grounds for nullity must be
within the purview of article 91, or, more specifically, it must
be within the meaning of the concept, a lack of free consent,
found in article 91.
That this is not the case is amply established in both the Code
and in French writings. Article 91 provides an explanation of
the term "free consent," to wit: "Consent is not free: 1. When
given to a ravisher... ; 2. [E]xtorted by violence; 3. When there
is a mistake respecting the person ... . -45 That is, a lack of free
consent is an issue of violence, threats, and error. Whether the
three situations mentioned be considered an exclusive enumera-
tion or as exemplary of the type of cases to be included, insanity
would not be included. In civil, canon, and at common law insan-
ity is separated from the idea of violence, threats, and error. As
explained above, insanity is held to be a question of capacity to
consent,46 resulting in French law in a total absence of consent,47
whereas threats, violence, and error are considered to be vices
affecting the consent of a person of full capacity,48 resulting in
present but defective consent. While many common law and civil
law jurisdictions hold that both situations result in relative nul-
lity, the essential difference between the two cases continues to
be i ecognized. That this distinction was recognized by the redac-
tor, of the Code of 1825 is evidenced by article 90,49 which states
that the law recognizes those marriages to which the parties
were "1. Willing to contract; 2. Able to contract; 3. Did con-
tract." (Emphasis added.) The result is that by the words of
45. Ibid.
46. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP, LLPMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL nos 708, 1010
(12th ed. 1939).
47. CODE CiviL art. 146; 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]k 1LIMENTAIRE DE DROIT
CIVIL no 1010 (12th ed. 1939).
48. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt fL]tMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL nos 1056-68S
(12th ed. 1939).
49. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 90 (1870). It should be noticed that CODE CIVIL art.
146, concerning the lack of consent and under which the French hold insanity
falls was not incorporated into the Louisiana Code. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
I1tLMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL nO 1010 (12th ed. 1939). Also, article 90 of the
Louisiana Civil Code does not appear in the French Code Civil. The inference
may be that article 90 of the Louisiana Civil Code was to take the place of article




article 91 insanity is excluded from the meaning of "free con-
sent" and, since article 110 speaks only of "marriages celebrated
without the free consent," insanity as a grounds for nullity does
not come within the application of that article. For that reason
it does not produce relative nullity. Rather, it must fall under
article 113 of chapter 4, which article classifies all grounds for
nullity not covered by article 110 as absolute nullities. Such a
view is consistent with that of the French writers.50
However, identifying the proper construction of the Code
does not provide a satisfactory solution to all of the problems
raised by the marriage of insane persons. This fact is well dem-
onstrated by a comparison of the two interpretations just dis-
cussed. Consider first the interpretation adopted by the Supreme
Court in the Stier case, that the marriage was relatively null, and
suit could be brought only by the insane person and only on con-
dition that there has been no free cohabitation after restoration
to sanity. This position conforms to the most severe stand taken
by certain common law jurisdictions and involves the difficulty
implicit in that view, specifically, that of leaving the sane per-
son entirely destitute of remedy, no matter how deserving his
cause may be. The correct interpretation, as suggested above,
would hold the marriages of the insane to be absolutely null, al-
lowing suit by either party, at any time and under any circum-
stances. This position would harmonize with French and canon
law, but the consequences of this view are well demonstrated by
the facts of the Stier case itself. Thus, despite the fact that there
the plaintiff had been married to the defendant for twelve years
and there were indications that she had married him with knowl-
edge of his alleged infirmity, the marriage would still have to
be regarded as a nullity. No doubt the decision was influenced
by the extreme delay in bringing suit and the court may have felt
compelled to interpret the Code so as to deny relief. Undoubtedly
the majority of the common law jurisdictions would have re-
jected a plea under such circumstances. Also administrative con-
siderations might have been persuasive to the court. Quite prob-
ably, the fact situation presented in the Stier case would be more
apt to arise than one more favorable to the plaintiff. To have
declared the marriage an absolute nullity might have exposed
the court to a flood of similar litigation, thus presenting a seri-
ous disturbance to the underlying objective of marital stability.




Nevertheless, the decision does have the effect of denying a rem-
edy to the sane party no matter what his circumstances may be.
This dilemma does not appear to be insolvable. A recom-
mended solution would be to amend the Code so as to declare the
marriage of an insane person absolutely null, thereby allowing
suit by either party, while also holding such marriages to be
susceptible of ratification, thus allowing suit only to those who
have not subsequently confirmed the marriage. This approach
is not wholly inconsistent with French theory. Planiol5 ' points
out that although the rule is that absolute nullities cannot be
ratified, exceptions to the rule are made in the cases of want of
puberty, clandestine marriages and incompetence of public offi-
cers. These situations, along with the case of insanity, are dis-
tinct from other absolute nullities, such as bigamy and incest, in
that the parties are not prohibited from marrying each other.
The marriages are null only by reason of some defect of form or
capacity. Should such defect be corrected there seems little rea-
son not to allow the marriage to stand. In the case of nullity on
the grounds of insanity, it being purely a question of the absence
of consent, a renewal of consent, either affirmative or tacit, at a
time when both parties are capable, should work a perfection of
the marriage.
It should be noticed that the suggested solution does not dis-
pose of the problem of marriage during the lucid interval. It is
quite possible that no satisfactory solution to that particular dif-
ficulty can be found so long as the question of the marriage of
the insane is treated in terms of capacity and consent. 52 Such a
51. Id. nos 1048, 1049. See note 16 wherein it is shown that ratification of
void marriages may have been allowed at common law.
52. Id. no 709 suggests that judicial interdiction is a solution to the lucid
interval problem, for during the period of interdiction, the person is de facto in-
capable of consent and his marriage would be null though celebrated in a period
of actual capacity.
But interdiction would appear to be a doubtful solution in view of the usual
distaste for judicial interdiction on the part of the relatives of an insane person.
Moreover, as pointed out in note 9 8upra, there exists a controversy as to whether
interdiction produces de facto incapacity, or prima facie evidence of incapacity
or whether capacity remains a question of fact even in the case of an interdicted
person.
In Louisiana, in the analogous case of a will executed by a person under
judicial interdiction, the Supreme Court has held that the presumption in favor
of a testator's mental capacity at the time of the execution of a will can be
overcome only by proof of incapacity in fact and that judicial interdiction is
merely evidence and not proof of such incapacity. Succession of Schmidt, 219 La.
675, 53 So.2d 834 (1951).
[Vol. XVI
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case does not appear to have arisen in Louisiana, but there seems
little doubt that the marriage would be held valid.
Daniel 1. Shea
Establishment and Termination of Public Rights
in Roads and Streets in Louisiana
In recent years the problem of determining the ownership
of lands underlying roads and streets has become extremely im-
portant. This is particularly so in the fields of taxation and
mineral rights, where it is necessary to ascertain the person who
must bear the tax responsibilities or is entitled to the benefits
of the revenues produced by the land. The right to explore for
minerals along public roads has often hinged on determining
the ownership of the underlying soil.' In real estate transactions,
problems concerning property owners' rights and liabilities re-
lating to public passageways have frequently been encountered. 2
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the various legal
methods by which the public use of roads and streets is created
and terminated. It is felt that by this approach the task of de-
termining ownership in these cases can be facilitated and the
rights and liabilities of the parties more clearly determined.
Establishment of Rights in Roads and Streets
The rights acquired by the public in the opening of a road
or street may be based on either ownership or servitude. The
difficulty met by the courts in determining these rights seems
to emanate from an inability to distinguish adequately between
the methods by which ownership is obtained and those by which
a servitude is acquired. In the following discussion an examina-
tion will be made of the six methods by which legal interests in
roads and streets have been established: (1) purchase, (2) ex-
propriation, (3) dedication, (4) three years' maintenance under
R.S. 48:491, (5) appropriation of river roads, and (6) prescrip-
tion. It should be noted that by the first three methods either
ownership or a servitude may be obtained. In the latter three,
however, only a servitude is acquired.
1. State v. Evans, 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140 (1948). In that case, the de-
fendants were convicted of unlawfully prospecting for oil, gas, and other minerals
by means of a mechanical device or otherwise on lands which were found to be
private.
2. E.g., Metairie Park, Inc. v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929).
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